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Statement of Jurisdiction 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to its granting of 
the Petition and Cross-Petition for Writ of Certiorari on December 10, 2007 pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a). 
Statement of Issues 
1. Did the Court of Appeals commit reversible error by ruling that Hickory Kist did 
not have constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition? 
This issue presents a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. State v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994), abrogated on other grounds by Campbell v. State 
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Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 2001 UT 89, 65 P.3d 1134, and modified on other grounds, 
State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50. 
This issue was preserved in the trial court by filing Reply Memorandum Opposing 
Motion For Summary Judgment And Memorandum In Support of Motion For Summary 
Judgment For Plaintiff (R. at 241), at the hearing on that Motion, by filing Objection to 
Proposed Order Granting Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment (R. at 294), and 
by filing a Notice of Appeal dated June 13, 2006. (R. at 299). The issue was also 
preserved by filing a Cross-Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
2. Did the Court of Appeals err in ruling that Miss Jex could not recover under the 
permanent condition theory of business owner liability? 
This issue presents a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. Pena, 869 
P.2d at 936 (Utah 1994). 
This issue was preserved in the trial court by filing Reply Memorandum Opposing 
Motion For Summary Judgment And Memorandum In Support of Motion For Summary 
Judgment For Plaintiff (R. at 241), at the hearing on that Motion, by filing Objection to 
Proposed Order Granting Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment (R. at 294), and 
by filing a Notice of Appeal dated June 13, 2006. (R. at 299). The issue was also 
preserved by filing a Cross-Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
Statutory and Constitutional Provisions 
There are no constitutional or statutory provisions that are applicable to this case. 
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Statement of the Case 
A. Nature of the Case, Course Proceedings, and Disposition in the Trial Court 
This case involves the claim of Donna Jex for injuries she received when she 
slipped on the wood floor at Hickory Kist's store. Motions for summary judgment were 
made by both parties. The honorable Judge Derek K. Pullan entered a final order granting 
the defendants' motion on June 6, 2006. Donna Jex then filed a timely appeal which the 
Utah Court of Appeals heard on July 19, 2007. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial 
court's ruling regarding constructive knowledge and method of operation, but reversed as 
to whether the dangerous condition was created by Hickory Kist or its employees. 
Hickory Kist then filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court and Donna 
Jex filed a Cross-Petition. Both petitions were granted on December 10, 2007. 
B. Statement of Facts 
On January 26, 2004, there was new snow. (R. at 290). James Fillmore, owner of 
Hickory Kist Meat Snacks and Deli, came in the back door of the store at about 5:00 a.m. 
(R. at 290). Mr. Fillmore was wearing Asics or Adidas athletic shoes. (R. at 289). At 
about 6:30 or 7:00, after removing the snow and spreading ice melt at the front part of the 
store, Mr. Fillmore walked through the front door of the store all the way to the back to 
start cooking. (R. at 290). Before any customers arrived Mr. Fillmore likely walked 
across the area where Miss Jex was injured many times. He walked across the floor 
before the mats were down and therefore could not clean his feet when he came in the 
door. 
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At about 5:30 a.m. Sharlene Barber, an employee of Hickory Kist, came into the 
store. (R. at 290). That day Sharlene was wearing Sketchers brand shoes with thick soles. 
(R. at 289). Sharlene usually turns the lights on, but cannot remember turning them on 
that day. (R. at 290). At about 7:00 a.m. Sharlene put mats on the floor. (R. at 290). 
Sharlene stated that prior to Jex's injury she and James Fillmore were the only people in 
the area where the injury occurred. (R. at 290). While Sharlene testified that she knew the 
wood floor was slick when wet, she does not inspect for water in the mornings and did 
not check for water the morning of the injury. (R. at 290). Further, because of her 
cooking duties and other responsibilities, it is unlikely that she would have noticed a wet 
spot by chance. (R. at 290). 
Donna Jex came into Hickory Kist prior to 8:30 a.m. Miss Jex was the first 
customer of the day and was wearing snow boots with new, but small tread. (R at 290, 
289, 202). As Miss Jex entered the store she noticed that the lights in the store were dim, 
as if some of the lights were not on. (R. at 290). When Miss Jex reached the cash register 
she turned right to go to the back of the store to make her order. (R. at 289). As she 
turned Miss Jex slipped on the wood floor due to a small puddle, about four inches in 
diameter. (R. at 289). As a result of the fall Miss Jex suffered a broken wrist, and injured 
her teeth and her back. 
Miss Jex's injury occurred about eight feet from the counter where employees 
assist customers. (R. at 290). When an employee is standing behind the counter, the 
employee can easily see the area where the injury occurred. (R. at 290). 
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On the day that Donna Jex was injured Hickory Kist failed to place mats on all 
walking areas. (R. at 289, 288). Mr. Fillmore decides where the floor mats will be placed. 
(R. at 288). While a mat had previously been placed over the area where Miss Jex fell, 
there was no mat in this area on the day in question. (R. at 288). Mr. Fillmore said he 
decided to remove the mat because it was getting in the way. (R. at 182-81). Thus, 
because Mr. Fillmore chose to have the mat removed, Miss Jex stepped from a mat onto a 
wet hardwood floor and slipped and fell. 
After the injury Mr. Fillmore inspected the area where the injury took place and 
found a small amount of water on Miss Jex's boots and on the floor. (R. at 289). 
Although Mr. Fillmore did not see any water on the floor prior to Miss Jex's injury, there 
is no evidence that he inspected the floor. There were no warning signs telling Miss Jex 
that the floor might be wet. (R. at 289). When asked about what source the water came 
from Mr. Fillmore stated that there were only two possible sources—his own shoes, or 
Miss Jex's. (R. at 289). While there was a Pepsi salesman that came in before Miss Jex's 
accident (R. at 289), he only walked through the store once, and none of the store 
employees list him as a possible source of the water. 
It is undisputed that Hickory Kist did not have a formal policy for keeping their 
floors clean from water and debris. (R. at 288). The employees were not given any 
instructions or formal training on inspecting the floor for water. (R. at 288, 204). Mr. 
Fillmore does not ever remember telling the employees to inspect the floor. (R. at 178). 
The written daytime checklist does not have anything on it about inspection of the floors. 
(R. at 178). Hickory Kist has a written checklist with daytime instructions, but the list 
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does not include any instructions about inspecting the floor for water. Further, rather than 
mopping up at various times throughout the day, Hickory Kist only has employees mop 
the floor at the end of the day. (R. at 288). 
Miss Jex is a 70-year-old widow. Her broken wrist has made it very difficult to 
perform her job as a substitute teacher. While she used to teach computers efficiently, she 
now has severe pain when she types. Carrying books to class and any other light lifting is 
now extremely difficult and painful. 
Response to Appellant's Issues1 
The Court of Appeals did not misconstrue Utah law when it held that a storeowner 
may be liable for a temporary condition that either the storeowner or one of his 
employees creates. 
Koer v. Mayfair Markets sets forth the rule that a storeowner is liable for a 
temporary unsafe condition in either of two situations. First, if the store/employee places 
the object causing the injury on the floor (condition created by an employee); or second, 
1
 While it is not critical to the issue on appeal, Hickory Kist argues that the Court of Appeals found that "there was 
no evidence that Hickory Kist's store owner and employees exercised anything less than reasonable care in the 
maintenance of the floors " Brief of Appellant, 5-6 This is an incorrect interpretation of what the Court of Appeals 
held The issue of reasonableness in floor maintenance was not addressed by the Court of Appeals The only 
statements made by the court in the references cited by Hickory Kist is that there was no evidence tending to show 
that the water had existed for a long enough time that constructive notice should have been imputed Jex v JRA, 
Inc , 2007 UT App % 16, 24 This statement by the court does not address whether actions by Hickory Kist or its 
employees in maintenance of its floor were reasonable Miss Jex maintains that the procedures for maintenance were 
not reasonable See affidavit of Miss Jex's safety expert attached as Appendix A hereto which is unrebutted Her 
expert, Charles Haines, who has over 40 years of safety experience in the industry, states that Defendant acted 
unreasonably His affidavit also addressed constructive knowledge and foresee ability Among other things, he says 
failure to have a policy m place with respect to floor maintenance is unreasonable The store owner cannot expect 
the employees to develop a policy on their own And " common sense it not enough There should be specific 
instructions and guidelines " Appendix A, paragraph (g) Further, Mr Haines said the owner " never recalled 
instructing his employees to 'inspect the floor' " and "after coming in the front and back of the business where 
Donna Jex fell, he should have inspected and cleaned the floor " Appendix A, Paragraph (d) Last, the owner knew 
the shiny hardwood floor was slippery when wet "When a floor is slippery, there should be mats in all walking 
areas In this case the owner had a mat in the area where Donna Jex fell, but he removed the mat where Donna Jex 
fell and did not replace it Mr Fillmore should have replaced the mat with another one " Appendix A, Paragraph (c) 
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if the store/employee was aware of the object (constructive or actual knowledge). Koer v. 
May fair Markets, All P.2d 566, 569 (Utah 1967). The existence of either situation can 
create liability. Id. This rule is not a reiteration of the two types of conditions (permanent 
and temporary) as argued by Hickory Kist. This rule sets forth two separate grounds of 
storeowner liability for temporary unsafe conditions. The Koer court determined the 
plaintiff could not recover for her slip and fall on either of two grounds. "[W]e are not 
able from the evidence to find any support for the further and necessary inference that 
this condition was caused by an act of the defendant, or that the defendant had actual or 
constructive knowledge of it." (Emphasis added.) Id. The plaintiff could have recovered 
for her injuries if she had shown either (1) that the grape was put on the floor by the 
defendant or (2) that the defendant had knowledge of the grape. 
The present case should be governed by Silcox and Koer, not by Schnuphase and 
Gobel as Hickory Kist suggests. Hickory Kist argues that Schnuphase and Gobel stand 
for the proposition that notice is required in all temporary condition cases. In light of the 
two distinct rules set out in Koer, this argument is incorrect. While Schnuphase and 
Gobel do state that notice is required, these two cases do not deal with the same fact 
scenario as is presented in the present case—neither Schnuphase nor Gobel deal with the 
creation of an unsafe condition by an employee. Koer and Silcox do address such a 
situation. In Koer it is unknown how the grape was put on the floor, so the court 
addresses both grounds of recovery. Koer, All P.2d 568, 569. Silcox deals with an unsafe 
condition that was created by the acts of an employee. Silcox v. Skaggs Alpha Beta, Inc., 
814 P.2d 623, 624 (Utah App. 1991). 
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Knowledge (either constructive or actual) by a storeowner/employee is not 
required for a plaintiff to recover under temporary condition theory. The court in Silcox 
did not require proof of knowledge for the plaintiff to recover. Silcox, 814 P.2d 623-25. 
The question remanded by the court was not whether actual or constructive knowledge 
existed, but whether the water was created by the defendant's employee. Id. at 624-25. 
Hickory Kist tries to distinguish Silcox from the present case on the grounds that the 
employee who left the ice in the cart certainly knew they had left it there. Brief of 
Appellant, 9. Hickory Kist seems to be inferring that the Silcox court required a finding 
of either constructive or actual notice even though such a requirement was not set forth in 
the case. This inference by Hickory Kist is incorrect. Again, the only question sent back 
on appeal was whether an employee created the temporary unsafe condition, not if there 
was any type of notice. Silcox, 814 P.2d at 624-625 
As has been established in the preceding paragraph, knowledge (either 
constructive or actual) was not, as Hickory Kist implies, a required element of recovery 
in the Silcox case. As an alternative argument, even if knowledge had been at issue, there 
was no difference between the knowledge of the employee in Silcox and the knowledge 
of Hickory Kist employees. The employee in Silcox would have known he left a cart with 
ice in it. Similarly, in this case Sharlene and Mr. Fillmore knew that they had snow on 
their shoes when they entered the store. Thus, both Sharlene and Mr. Fillmore had 
knowledge of the condition that created water on the floor just as the employee in Silcox 
had knowledge of the ice in the cart which created water on the floor. If Hickory Kist is 
asserting that the employee in Silcox had constructive knowledge because he left a cart 
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with melting ice in it, then Mr. Fillmore and Sharlene also had constructive knowledge of 
the water on the floor because they left melting snow from their shoes on the store floor. 
Summary of Arguments 
The Court of Appeals erred in determining that there was no evidence showing 
that the water Miss Jex slipped on had been there for a significant amount of time. 
Evidence such as the tread on shoes, the activities of Hickory Kist employees before the 
store opened, and other factors show that there is much more than speculation and 
conjecture in imputing constructive notice on Hickory Kist. 
The Court of Appeals committed reversible error when it determined that Miss Jex 
could not recover under the permanent condition theory because the court failed to 
recognize Hickory Kist's wood flooring as an inherently dangerous condition. The court 
also failed to recognize that a slip and fall by a customer was foreseeable in light of the 
snowy weather conditions and the failure of Mr. Fillmore to place mats in all areas of 
customer traffic. 
Argument 
I. The Court of Appeals erred affirming the district court's judgment 
that Hickory Kist had no constructive notice of the dangerous 
condition. 
For a plaintiff to recover when it is unknown who created the unsafe condition the 
plaintiff must prove two things. First, the plaintiff must show that the store owner or his 
employees had knowledge of the unsafe condition. Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 
918 P.2d 476, 478 (Utah 1996). Second, the plaintiff must show that the store owner or 
his employees had adequate time to remedy the condition. Id. 
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The knowledge requirement is satisfied if the owner or his employees had either 
actual or constructive knowledge of the unsafe condition. Id. Constructive knowledge 
exists if the unsafe condition existed for a long enough time that the owner or employees 
should have discovered it. Id. 
Turning to Utah case law, plaintiffs have been hindered by the lack of clear 
criteria for proving constructive knowledge. See Lindsay v. Eccles Hotel Co., 284 P.2d 
477 (Utah 1955) (Plaintiff slipped and fell on water at the defendant's coffee shop. There 
was no evidence as to who spilled the water, or how long the water had been there before 
the plaintiff slipped on it); Koer v. MayfairMkts, 431 P.2d 566 (Utah 1967) (Plaintiff 
slipped and fell on a grape in the defendant's store. There was no evdience put on by the 
plaintiff to show who had put the grape on the floor or how long it might have been 
there); Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms, Inc., 538 P.2d 175 (Utah 1975) (Plaintiff slipped 
on cottage cheese in the defendant's store. There was no evidence offered by the plaintiff 
to show how long the cottage cheese had been there and no one had seen cottage cheese 
on the floor prior to the incident.). While it is clear from these four cases that courts will 
not find constructive knowledge from mere allegations by the plaintiff, there are no 
specific requirements set forth for proving constructive knowledge. The only clear rule 
regarding constructive knowledge is that the existence of an unsafe condition for two to 
four minutes is not long enough to impute such knowledge. See Schnuphase, 918 P.2d at 
478. 
While Utah cases have not set forth clear criteria for determining when 
constructive notice should be imputed, other jurisdictions have. Constructive knowledge 
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should be imputed on a case-by-case basis. Miller v. Crown Mart, Inc., 425 P.2d 690, 692 
(Colo. 1967). While the length of time a condition existed is one of the most important 
factors, the following factors must also be considered: nature of the condition, its 
foreseeable consequences, the means and opportunities of discovering it, the diligence 
required to discover and correct it, and the foresight which a person of ordinary prudence 
would have exercised under similar circumstances. Id. 
In addition, other jurisdictions charge a store owner with constructive knowledge 
when an employee of the owner was in the immediate area of the dangerous condition 
and could have easily seen the substance. Banks v. Colonial Stores, Inc., 161 S.E.2d 366, 
368 (Ga. Ct. App. 1968). "When it is alleged that an employee is in the immediate area of 
the dangerous condition and has the means and opportunity to discover the same, it then 
becomes a question for the jury whether the defendant in the exercise of due care should 
have discovered and either warned the plaintiff or corrected the alleged hazard." Id. The 
unsafe condition does not have to exist for a specific period of time for this type of 
constructive knowledge to exist. Id. 
Utah courts must adopt similar criteria for determining when constructive 
knowledge exists because without such requirements there is an incentive for business 
owners to ignore unsafe conditions. The law must set reasonable requirements for 
proving constructive knowledge so that businesses maintain their premises in a 
reasonably safe manner. 
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In the present case the Court of Appeals determined that there was no direct 
evidence suggesting that the water Miss Jex slipped on had been there for any significant 
amount of time. The court stated that there was nothing about the water itself that 
suggested it had been there for a long time, and further, that there was no reasonable 
inference that the owner should have been aware of the water. Jex v. JRA, Inc., 2007 UT 
App. 249,116. The Court of Appeals erred in this determination. When the evidence 
surrounding the appearance of the water are considered, there is much more than 
speculation and conjecture showing that constructive notice should be imputed on 
Hickory Kist. 
The evidence showing that Hickory Kist had constructive knowledge is as follows. 
First, the shoes of Mr. Fillmore and Sharlene had deep tread (See R. at 289). Snow would 
have easily become lodged in the deep grooves of their shoes and would have been 
tracked onto the wood floor when they entered the store. Second, Mr. Fillmore had been 
outside shoveling the snow before he entered the front of the store (R. at 290). Shoveling 
would have required Mr. Fillmore to step in large amounts of snow numerous times 
whereas Miss Jex walked into the store after snow removal had occurred (R. at 290). 
Third, the amount of time needed for snow to melt into water would not have occurred in 
the one second it took Miss Jex to step from the mat onto the wood floor. Fourth, with the 
small tread on Miss Jex's shoes, any traces of water and snow would almost certainly 
been removed from her shoes by the time she reached the wood floor because she walked 
on approximately twenty five feet of mats before she arrived at the counter. (See R. at 
289). On the other hand, the mats were not out when Mr. Fillmore and Sharlene walked 
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through the front of the store. (See R. al 290). When taken in a light most favorable to the 
plaintiff, the facts show that either Sharlene or Mr. Fillmore tracked in the snow that 
caused the water on the floor. Thus, the water most likely was on the floor for 1-2 hours 
before Miss Jex slipped on it. 
The length of time the water was on the floor is a very important factor in 
determining if the water should have been discovered by Mr. Fillmore or Sharlene. 
However, length of time must be considered in conjunction with the other case specific 
factors such as nature of the condition, foreseeable consequences, the means and 
opportunities of discovering it, the diligence required to discover and correct it, and the 
foresight which a person of ordinary prudence would have exercised under similar 
circumstances. 
In the present case the water should have been discovered and remedied by either 
Sharlene or Mr. Fillmore. Hickory Kist is a small store that does not get a lot of traffic. 
The area of the store is not large and thus, it is easy to inspect the floor frequently. It 
would not be unreasonable for Hickory Kist to have a policy in place requiring 
employees to check their small floor for water and other debris every thirty minutes. The 
water was in a place easily visible to Hickory Kist's employee, Sharlene. The water was 
only eight feet away from where Sharlene was performing her responsibilities. It was in a 
plainly visible, un-obscure spot and would have taken little effort to discover. Also, 
because Hickory Kist had not opened for the day, there would have been no customers to 
obstruct Sharlene's view of the floor. With snowy weather conditions, a person of 
ordinary prudence would have had the foresight to know that water and snow would be 
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tracked in. Such a person would have put up warning signs, covered all wood areas with 
mats, and inspected the premise before opening for the day. 
Unlike previous Utah cases, Miss Jex has provided sufficient circumstantial 
evidence showing how long the water was on the floor before she slipped on it. This case 
is distinguishable from previous Utah cases such as Koer, Lindsay, and Allen, because 
Miss Jex, unlike previous plaintiffs, provided evidence of how long the dangerous 
condition existed. Further, this case is distinguishable from Schnuphase because the 
water was on Hickory Kist's floor much longer than two to four minutes. 
In short, the evidence shows that Hickory Kist had constructive knowledge of the 
water because the water was present for at least an hour, was dangerous, could have 
easily been discovered, and could have easily been removed. While Hickory Kist is not 
an insurer of its patron's safety, Hickory Kist must be responsible for accidents like this 
where its employee's negligent acts result in injury to patrons. 
II. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the district court's 
judgment that there was no permanent dangerous condition. 
When a business's method of operation creates a situation where it is reasonably 
foreseeable that the acts of third parties will create a dangerous condition, they are liable 
for injures resulting from the dangerous condition. Canfield v. Albertsons, Inc., 841 P.2d 
1224, 1226 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). As long as the condition causing the injury was 
inherently dangerous and foreseeable, then the business owner is liable. Id. Manner of 
use or method of operation is a permanent condition even though a temporary condition 
such as a head of lettuce is involved. Id. There is no logical distinction "between a 
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situation in which the store owner directly creates the situation and where the store 
owner's method of operation creates a situation..." Id. The type of flooring a store uses 
can be an inherently dangerous condition. DeWeese v. J.C. Penney Co., 297 P.2d 898, 
901 (Utah 1956). If an inherently dangerous condition is employed the business must 
discharge their duty of reasonable care by employing safety measures that will protect 
customers from the risk of injury that the condition creates. Canfield, 841 P.2d at 1227. 
To recover under this theory a plaintiff does not have to prove notice of the condition. Id 
at 1226. 
In DeWeese v. J.C Penney the court concluded that, since the defendants knew 
their floor surfacing was slippery when wet, the only remaining question was whether the 
defendant discharged its duty to use reasonable diligence to protect its customers against 
the surfacing. DeWeese, 297 P.2d at 901. The court concluded that reasonable minds 
could find that the defendant had failed to employ proper safety measures in light of the 
weather conditions. Id. 
In Canfield v. Albertsons, Albertsons sold lettuce that did not have the wilted outer 
leaves removed. Canfield, 841 p.2d at 1225. It thus put out empty boxes for customers to 
put the wilted leaves in. Id. The court determined that these facts, when viewed in a light 
most favorable to the plaintiff, showed that this method of selling and displaying lettuce 
leaves was inherently dangerous. Id. at 1227. The court further concluded this method of 
operation made it foreseeable that lettuce leaves would be left on the floor and that 
customers may slip on them. Id.. Given Albertsons chosen method of operation, the Court 
determined the critical question was whether Albertsons had done what was reasonably 
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necessary to protect the customers from injuries that would likely be caused by the 
method of selling and displaying lettuce. Id. "Each determination of whether the 
protective measures taken were reasonable is fact sensitive. . . In any event, the fact 
finder must determine whether the storeowner's vigilance in protecting against the 
condition or hazard was commensurate with the risk created by the method of operation." 
Id. The court decided that since Albertsons did not have mats and because the plaintiff 
challenged Albertsons' assertion that it had cleaned the area shortly before her fall, there 
was a question of fact for the jury and summary judgment was not proper. Id. 
In the present case the Court of Appeals determined that there was a lack of direct 
evidence showing that Hickory Kist chose a method of operation that was inherently 
dangerous and foreseeable and that Hickory Kist did not have notice that it had created a 
potentially hazardous condition. Jex v. JRA, Inc., 2007 UT App. 249, f 23.The Court of 
appeals erred in making this conclusion. It is undisputed that wood flooring was used in 
the defendants' store. (R. at 215). It is also undisputed that Mr. Fillmore knew the floor 
was slick when wet (R. at 289), and yet, on a snowy day, failed to direct employees to put 
mats in all areas of customer traffic. (R. at 288). Just like the defendant in DeWesse 
Hickory Kist chose to employ a floor surfacing that was inherently dangerous when wet. 
Due to the snowy weather conditions a slip-and-fall was foreseeable. On the day 
of the accident James Fillmore and his employee Sharlene knew that it was snowing 
outside. (R. at 210, 290). They had seen the snow and knew that it would be tracked in. 
Mr. Fillmore had even shoveled snow off of his store's premises. (R. at 290, 224). These 
facts, when taken in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that the inherently 
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dangerous condition (the wet wood floor) was foreseeable to Hickory Kist. Thus, the 
inherently dangerous and foreseeable elements are met. 
The essential question then becomes whether or not Hickory Kist did what was 
reasonable necessary to protect customers from wet wood flooring. The undisputed facts 
show that Hickory Kist did not meet this requirement. Hickory Kist had no formal 
policies in place for cleaning, sweeping., and checking its floors throughout the day. (R. at 
179-78). While Mr. Fillmore testified that keeping the floors clean was an important 
issue, there were no scheduled checks or scheduled sweepings throughout the day. (R. at 
179-78). There was a daily checklist of jobs, but the checklist did not include inspecting 
the floors. (R. at 178). Hickory Kist also did not meet its duty of reasonable care because 
it failed to place mats throughout all areas of customer traffic. (See R. at 288). On the day 
in question, when it was foreseeable thai snow would be tracked in, there was not a mat 
where Miss Jex slipped (R. at 288), yet it was an area where customers frequently 
stepped. 
Even if the water was brought in by Miss Jex, Hickory Kist is still responsible for 
the injuries she sustained. When a store creates an inherently dangerous condition, it is 
responsible for conditions created by third parties. Thus, since Hickory Kist used wood 
flooring it is responsible for the slippery surface no matter who tracked the water in or 
when it was tracked in. The only relief from liability would be if Hickory Kist used 
reasonable precautions to protect customers from slipping on the wet wood floor. 
Hickory Kist did not meet this burden and thus is liable no matter who tracked in the 
water. 
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Last, if the moving party shows there is no material disputed fact, the burden shifts 
to the nonmoving party "who may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials in the 
pleadings," but "must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial." 
Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, 8; Bluffdale v. Smith, 2007 UT App 25, f 8-9, 156 P.3d 
175. Undisputed facts which are not cited in the undisputed facts section of a motion for 
summary judgment, but which are cited and argued in the memorandum in support of the 
motion are in substantial compliance with Rule 7. Salt Lake County v. Metro West Ready 
Mix, 2004 UT 23, f 23, 89 P.3d 496. 
Donna Jex filed with her Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (on the issue of 
breach of the duty of care only) an affidavit of Charles Haines, a safety expert with 
approximately 40 years of safety experience, who stated that the store owner breached the 
standard of care by, among other things, failing to inspect his own tracks and by 
removing, and failing to replace, the rug where Donna fell. He also stated that Hickory 
Kist's method of operation breached the standard of care and created an unreasonably 
dangerous condition. (See Appendix A). While Jex did not state in her undisputed facts 
that "defendants breached the standard of care" and that "defendants created an 
inherently dangerous and foreseeable dangerous condition" she did cite her expert's 
affidavit in the undisputed facts section, and argued in her memorandum that Hickory 
Kist breached the standard of care and created a dangerous condition. Since industry 
standards regarding store safety are not within the knowledge of the normal person, the 
logical response from Hickory Kist would be for it to file an affidavit from its own safety 
expert stating that defendant did not create a dangerous condition and that defendant 
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acted reasonably under the circumstances. But Defendant did not file an affidavit 
controverting Miss Jex's expert's affidavit, and did not file a Rule 56(f) motion asking 
for more time to respond to the expert affidavit. Although Hickory Kist filed a response 
to Jex's motion for summary judgment and denied that it created a dangerous condition 
and that it acted unreasonably, it never even referred to her expert's affidavit in its 
argument. This issue was raised before the Trial Court in Donna Jex's Motion for 
Summary Judgment (R. at 241) and the Appellate Court (R. at 299). 
Since Donna Jex met her burden of proof by filing an affidavit showing that 
defendant created an unreasonably dangerous condition and acted unreasonably in 
protecting customers on a slippery floor, the burden shifted to Defendant who failed to 
carry its burden as stated in Orvis and Bluffdale. Thus, the District Court should have not 
ruled against Donna Jex, but should have ruled in her favor on her Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment. The fact that Plaintiff did not state in her undisputed facts section 
that "defendant created a dangerous condition" and "defendant acted unreasonably and 
breached a duty of care" does not prevent the Court from granting her motion as stated in 
Metro West Ready Mix because she referred to the affidavit in her motion and argued in 




For the foregoing reasons, the Court of Appeals' decision regarding constructive 
notice and permanent condition should be overturned. The Court should rule that 
Defendant breached the standard of care because it failed to carry its burden, and the 
issues of causation and damages should be remanded back to the trial court for 
determination by a jury. 
Dated this ^ 1 day of February 2008. 
tun 
Denton M. Hatch 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT by first-class mail, postage prepaid, this ^ / 
day of February 2008, to: 
Robert L. Janicki 
Michael L. Ford 
STRONG & HANNI 
3 Triad Center, Suite 500 
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DENTON M. HATCH, #1413 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
128 West 900 North, Suite C 
Spanish Fork, UT 84660 
Phone (801) 794-3852 
Fax (801) 794-3859 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT 




JRA INC. dba HICKORY KIST DELI, 




CHARLES R. HAINES 
Civil No. 050100121 
Division 9 
Judge Derek P. Pullan 
Charles It Haines, being first duly sworn, deposes and states: 
1. I am a certified safety professional! and attached as Exhibit A is my CV. 
2. I have reviewed the depositions in the captioned case of James FillmoTc, Donna 
Jex, Sharlcne Barber, Randy Russell, and Angela Fillmore. 
3. Tt is my opinion that Hickory Kist Deli and its owners, the Filhnores, did not 
exercise ordinary care to keep the premises in a condition reasonably safe for the business visitor 
and failed to have a proper method of operation in the following ways: 
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(a) The lights were dim when Donna Jex entered the store. This made it more 
difficult for her to see a small puddle of water. 
(b) Snow felj the night before. James Fillmore came in the store about 5:00 
a.m. through the back door, and later, he came in the front door after shoveling the 
front and spreading ice melt Then he went to the back and started cooking. He 
said he could have walked over the area several times where the injury occurred. 
He did not see water on the floor, and there is no evidence he inspected the floor, 
He should have inspected the floor before he went back to cook. Donna Jcx 
came In the store early in the morning about 7:30 to 8:30 a,m. before any other 
customer according to Mr. Fillmore. Sharlene Barber, an employee who also 
came in the back door, placed the mats on the floor that morning about 7 a.m.» but 
did not inspect the floor even though the area was in plain view. 
(c) The owners and employees knew that the shiny hardwood floor was 
slippery when wet When a floor is slippery, there should be mats in alt walking 
areas. In this case, the owner had a mat in the area where Donna Jex fell, but 
moved the mat before Donna Jex fell and did not replace it. Mr. Fillmore should 
have replaced the mat with a another one. 
(d) The employees should have been instructed to Inspect the floor aiier each 
person entered the building on a snowy day. Mr. Fillmore, the owner, said he never 
recalled instructing his employees to 'Inspect the floor/' la this case, Mr. Fillmore 
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came from the outside twice in athletic shoes which were either Adidas or Asics, 
which have tread which will carry snow and ice melt. He came in the back and 
front doors and walked over the area of the injury. Ice melt can also sometimes 
cause a floor to be slippery. After coming in front and back of the business and 
walking through the area where Donna Jex fell, he should have inspected and 
cleaned the floor. 
(e) Likewise, employee Sfoarlene Barber wore Sketchers athletic shoes with 
thick soles, She also walked across the area of the injury and had tread that would 
carry snow and ice melt. She said she never inspected the floor in the morning and 
did not inspect that morning even though the area was in plain view. 
(f) Most customers stay on the mats when they purchase something at the 
counter. Donna Jex stepped off the mats because she had to go to the back of the 
store to make a large order. In this case, Donna Jex had shoes with new but small 
tread which would not carry a significant amount of snow across the mgs she 
walked on when she came in. She came in the front door where the snow was 
mostly removed so there was probably not any snow on the top of her shoes, Since 
the tread was new, it would provide resistance to slipping unless the floor is 
slippery when wet. In addition, she stated that she saw the puddle at the same time 
she was felling. This indicates that the water was there before she got to it and that 
the snow had time to melt. 
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(g) The business did not have, but should have had written instructions and a 
daily check list regarding caring for the floor on a snowy day. The owner bad a 
check list for employees, but it did not include inspecting for water or snow, The 
employees were supposed to use common sense and inspect the floor when they 
cleaned the tables, but common sense is not enough. There should be specific 
instructions and guidelines. For example in this case no customers came in before 
Donna Jex so no tables were cleaned and no floors inspected. 
(b) There was no sign alerting customers thai the floor was slippery when wet. 
(!) The business should have had an A-frame to put out when water was 
tracked into the business. 
0) The employees had no specific formal training on keeping the floor dry on 
snowy days or any other type of training regarding water on the floor, 
(k) When a person moves from a mat to a slick surface, the reduction in 
fiiction is a major cause of falls. In this case, the area where Donna Jex M was a 
slick floor because the mitt had been removed. As she moved from the mat to the 
slick floor the reduction in fiiction increased the probability of her failing, 
(1) On a snowy day if a salesman arrives at the store early in the morning, the 
owner should instruct employees to check the floor after he entered or the owner 
should do it. In this case, employees James Fillmore and Shartene Barber knew that 
a salesman came from the outside and walked to the back of the stars. It is unclear 
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whether he could be a source of the water because neither employees listed htm as 
a possibility when asked in their depositions, and there is another way to get to the 
back where he went But in any event, Mr. Fillmore or another employee should 
have checked the stick areas immediately after the salesman walked over the area. 
Inspection is not difficult since the area of the iqjuiy was in plain view and easily 
seen from the front counter. 
(m) Snow melt can cause increased slipping on a hard, slick floor. Mr. Fillmore 
should take precautions to make sure it is not tracked into the store after he spreads 
it outside. 
Dated this if — **y of FebraaTy 2006. 
Charles K. Haines 
State of 
County of S ^ ^ H J ) 
On this I* dty of February 2006, personally appeared before me Charles R. Hainei, 
the signer of the foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
DATED this [ / day of February 2006. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Charles 
R. Haines this / / day of February 2006, to: 
Robert L. Janicki 
Strong & Hanni P.C. 
3 Triad Center, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
Secretary * 
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C.R. HAINES & ASSOCIATES INC. 
CHARLES R HAINES, PE. CALIF. &MASS. 825 WHEELWRIGHT DRIVE 
IN SAFETY ENGINEERING MANCHESTER. MISSOURI 63021 
CERTIFIED SAFETY PROFESSIONAL PHONE/FAX(636) 227-3959 
PROFESSIONAL SAFETY BACKGROUND 
OF 
CHARLES R. HAINES 
EDUCATION 
1958-1962 University of Pennsylvania (Penn), Philadelphia, PA. BA 
Sociology, One Year Mechanical Engineering. 
1963 -1964 George Washington University MBA Courses. 
TEACHING EXPERIENCES 
Numerous Safety Courses taught for Industry, The National Safety Council, 
Regional Safety Councils, and the American Society of Safety Engineers, 
including Safety Program Development, Audits, Accident and Reconstruction, 
General Industrial Safety, Construction Safety, Ladder/Scaffold Safety, 
Amusement and Water Park Safety. 
ORAL PRESENTATIONS 
National Safety Congress, (numerous) including Machine Guarding, Safe 
Scaffolding and Evaluating Facility, Equipment and Safety Program Loss 
Control, Regional Safety Council (numerous), Associated General Contractors 
of America Regional Meetings, and American Society of Safety Engineers. 
PUBLICATIONS, ARTICLES AND SCRIPTS 
A THE NEW CONSTRUCTION SAFETY ACT" - GLASS DIGEST. 
NOVEMBER 1971 
B "GOALS FOR A SAFETY DIRECTOR" - NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL 
NEWSLETTER. FEBRUARY 1978 
C WROTE THE SCRIPT FOR SAFE DRIVING FILM SPONSORED BY 
ANHEUSER OUSCH, "AT THE WHEEL' FEATURING PAUL NEWMAN. 
D 'PREVENTING EYE, FACE AND HEAD HAZARDS" - OCCUPATIONAL 
HAZARDS. FEBRUARY 1984 (BY INTERVIEW] 
E "WHY HAVE A SAFETY PROGRAM" - BEER MARKETING MAGAZINE. 
DECEMBER 1984. 
F "HOW TO IMPLEMENT AN EFFECTIVE SAFETY PROGRAM" - BEER 
MARKETING MAGAZINE JANUARY 1985! 
G "MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE PROVIDES SAFETY FOUNDATION" - NATIONAL SAFETY 
COUNCIL NEWSLETTER. MAY 1977 
EXPERIENCE HIGHLIGHTS 
1984 - PRESENT PRINCIPAL, C.R. HAINES & ASSOCIATES, INC. 
A Safety and Loss Control Consulting firm working in accident prevention, 
safety training, accident reconstruction, consulting and expert witness in 
litigation. 
1977 - 1984 Anheuser-Busch Companies, Inr. . St I nuis. M f l Corporate 
Di ieuui uf Safely and MealUi. Had uveiall Safety and Mectllli looiJuuoiUililtes 
for all major areas of corporation including breweries, theme parks, water 
parks, grain elevators, yeast plants, company owned distributors, vehicle fleet 
safety, malt plants, bakeries, etc. 
1967 - 1977 PPG Industries, Pittsburgh, PA. Plant divisional and corporate 
safety director. As Corporate Safety Director was responsible for ail areas of 
Safety and Loss Control in the corporation which included glass, fiberglass, 
paint and fiberglass manufacturing divisions, plus the construction division. 
1965 - 1966 Corhart Refractories (Subsidiary of Coming Glass) Louisville, KY. 
Plant Safety director for two refractory plants (foundry type operations). 
1964 - 1965 Ford Motor Company, Louisville, KY. Supervisor of a section of 
the heavy truck assembly line. 
1962 - 1964 Commissioned United States Army Officer - PX Officer -
Honorable Discharge. 
ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND 
1 BOARD CERTIFIED SAFETY PROFESSIONAL - NATIONAL REGISTRATION 
BY EXAM SINCE (7 /1172) Certificate 18590 
2 PROFESSIONAL ENGINEER IN SAFETY ENGINEERING - REGISTEHED IN CALIFORNIA SINCE 
10/13/78 Cartlflcats #Ofl18 
3 PROFESSIONAL SAFETY ENGINEER - REGISTERED IN MASSACHUSETTS SINCE ,fl/24/9fl. 
License # 3fl90fl 
4 CERTIFIED MISSOURI SAFETY CONSULTANT SINCE 2/8/95 
5 MISSOURI SAFETY COUNCIL - VICE PRESIDENT. 5 YEARS 
6 ST. LOUIS SAFETY COUNCIL - EXECUTIVE BOARD AND DIRECTOR 10 YEARS 
7 AMERICAN SOCIETY OF SAFETY ENGINEERS- NATIONAL FINANCE COMMITTEE 
8 AMERICAN SOCIETY OF SAFETY ENGINEERS - ST. LOUIS CHAPTER 
PRESIDENT. VICE PRESIDENT, SECRETARY. TREASURER 
9 UNITED STATES BREWERS ASSOCIATION - SAFETY COMMITTEE. 7 YEARS 
10 AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR TESTING AND MATERIALS - MEMBER COMMITTEE F24 ON 
AMUSEMENT RIDES AND DEVICES, REGARDING AMUSEMENT RIDE SAFETY 
11 GENERAL CHAIRMAN - MISSOURI GOVERNOR'S STATE SAFETY 
CONFERENCE, 4 YEARS 
12 NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL MEMBER - FOOD ANO BEVERAGE. CONSTRUCTION 
AND GLASS AND CERAMICS SECTIONS, 25+ YEARS 
13 INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF AMUSEMENT PARKS AND ATTHACTTONS. SAFETY 
MEETINGS ATTENDED 
14 AMERICAN SOCIETY OF SAFETY ENGINEERS PROFESSIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT NATIONAL CONFERENCE COORDINATOR 
15 MEMBER ANSI/AMERICAN SOCIETY OF MECHANICAL ENGINEERS B56.1 
NATIONAL FORK TRUCK SAFETY STANDARDS COMMITTEE PAST MEMBER 
16 NATIONAL AND REGIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL SPEAKER ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS 
17 CONDUCTED SAFETY TRAINING FOR THE NATIONAL AND REGIONAL 
SAFETY COUNCILS ON MACHINE GUARDING, SCAFFOLDING AND 
OTHER TOPICS 
1 A RECEIVED NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL CERTIFICATE OF ACHIEVEMENT IN 1978 AND 1982 
19 ATTENDED IN EXCESS OF 30 SAFETY PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
COURSES OF 2 DAYS TO 2 WEEKS DURATION OVER THE PAST 30 YEARS. 
TYPICAL COURSES WERE. 
A INTERNATIONAL SAFETY ACADEMY ADVANCED SAFETY 
TRAINING 
B AMERICAN SOCIETY OF SAFETY ENGINEERS PROFESSIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT CONFERENCES 
C INTERNATIONAL L08S CONTROL INSTITUTE 
D PENN STATE UNIVERSITY SAFETY COURSES 
E UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR - CERTIFIED 
INSTRUCTOR CONSTRUCTION SAFETY AND HEALTH 
F US DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH. EDUCATION ANO WELFARE 
(NIOSH COURSES) 
G SAFETY FIRST INDUSTRIES • FIRE PREVENTION TECHNIQUES 
H ANSUL FIRE EXTINGUISHER COMPANY-- FIRE FIGHTING 
TECHNIQUES 
I NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL COURSES, VARIOUS 
J- STATE OF OHIO - CERTIFIED SAFETY TRAINING INSTRUCTORS 
COURSE (40 HOUR) 
K NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL INDUSTRIAL HYGIENE COURSE 
L CONFINED SPACE ENTRY AND RESCUE COURSE 
20 NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL DEFENSIVE DRIVING COURSE INSTRUCTOR 
21 AMERICAN RED CROSS FIRST AID COURSE INSTRUCTOR 
22 DEVELOPED PPG CORPORATE SAFETY PROGRAM FOR SUSPENDED AND 
STEEL SCAFFOLDING USE 
23 DEVELOPED NUMEROUS CORPORATE SAFETY PROGRAMS, 
PROCEDURES AND MANUALS 
24 WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA SAFETY COUNCIL CONSTRUCTION 
SECTION PAST MEMBER 
25 MEMBER AMERICAN SOCIETY OF SAFETY ENGINEERS NATIONAL 
CONSULTANTS DIVISION. MANAGEMENT DIVISION AND CONSTRUCTION 
DIVISION 
26 INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF PAINTERS AND ALLIED TRADES 
INDUSTRY REPRESENTATIVE ON SAFETY COMMITTEE. PARTICIPATED 
IN WRITING SAFETY MANUAL AND CONTRIBUTED TO APPRENTICESHIP 
TRAINING SAFETY PROGRAM. 
27 OUTDOOR AMUSEMENT BUSINESS ASSOCIATION MEMBER 15+ YEARS 
28 SYSTEM SAFETY SOCIETY PAST MEMBER 10+ YEARS 
29 AMERICAN 30CIErY FOR TESTING AND MATERIALS • MEMBER COMMITTEE F13 ON 
PEDESTRIAN AND WALKWAY SAFETY AND POOTWQAlR 
30 HUMAN FACTORS AND ERGONOMICS SOCIETY PAST MBMBBR 12+ YBARS 
31 LISTED IN 'THE BEST LAWYERS IN AMERICA' DIRECTORY OF EXPERTS" SINCE 1991 
3 2 LISTED IN THE AMEfllCAN SOCIETY OF SAFETY ENGINEERS 'NATIONAL DIRECTORY OF 
SAFETY CONSULTANTS" f, ' ~ 
